Observer-Based Attack Detection and Mitigation for Load Frequency Control System

Cyber attack endangers the stability of load frequency control (LFC), and could cause severe damage to power system operation. In this paper, false data injection (FDI) attack on LFC is specifically investigated, and a novel composite detection and mitigation scheme is presented to achieve FDI attack defense. Instead of focusing solely on attack detection or mitigation, the composite scheme is designed by considering the inherently inseparable interconnection between detection and mitigation. Herein, for the first time an observer-based attack detector is used to quantify the FDI signal, which is then excluded from the H infinity-based control loop for attack mitigation, such that the frequency instability is significantly attenuated. From the simulation results of a multi-area LFC control system, the effectiveness of the proposed scheme is demonstrated.

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