Network Throughput and Reliability: Preventing Hazards and Attacks Through Gaming—Part 2: A Research Agenda

It is clear from the discussions in the previous chapter that, while there has been work done on improving network throughput and reliability, only a plethora of literature discusses a unified model to address both hazards and attacks. This is the motivation behind the previous chapter and the current one, where an attempt is made to bridge this gap. In spite of our initial modeling and computational experiments, no one has yet established the formal conditions under which a Pareto Nash equilibrium exists to prevent both hazards and attacks. Such an equilibrium includes the necessary posturing to discourage terrorist attacks, and to perform preventive maintenance and upgrade on our critical civil infrastructure ahead of a hazard. Meanwhile, general principles of how to best defend systems of specific types against intelligent attacks are emerging that can help system managers to allocate resources to best defend their systems. The research framework outlined in this chapter will gain insights into hazards and attack mitigation for a variety of infrastructure networks. In addition, there is much that can be done in the behavioral science perspective.

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