The paradox of the preface and the lottery paradox are paradoxes of practical certainty sharing certain features. The paradox of the lottery argues that rational agents are at once practically certain that each ticket in a lottery will lose but also practically certain some ticket will win. The paradox of the preface argues that rational agents are at once practically certain that all facts in a written volume are true, yet are also practically certain that some fact is wrong. A difference between real lotteries and prefaces is that a winning lottery ticket is generally an intended feature of the lottery, whereas incorrect facts are generally unintended.
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