Case study of the Miner Botnet

Malware and botnets are one of the most serious threats to today's Internet security. In this paper, we characterise the so-called &Miner Botnet”. It received major media attention after massive distributed denial of service attacks against a wide range of German and Russian websites, mainly during August and September 2011. We use our insights on this botnet to outline current botnet-related money-making concepts and to show that multiple activities of this botnet are actually centred on the virtual anonymised currency Bitcoin, thus justifying the name. Furthermore, we provide a binary-level analysis of the malware's design and components to illustrate the modularity of the previously mentioned concepts. We give an overview of the structure of the command-and-control protocol as well as of the botnet's architecture. Both centralised as well as distributed infrastructure aspects realised through peer-to-peer are present to run the botnet, the latter for increasing its resiliency. Finally, we provide the results of our ongoing tracking efforts that started in September 2011, focusing on the development of the botnet's size and geographic distribution. In addition we point out the challenge that is generally connected with size measurements of botnets due to the reachability of individual nodes and the persistence of IP addresses over time.

[1]  Felix C. Freiling,et al.  Measurements and Mitigation of Peer-to-Peer-based Botnets: A Case Study on Storm Worm , 2008, LEET.

[2]  Felix C. Freiling,et al.  Walowdac - Analysis of a Peer-to-Peer Botnet , 2009, 2009 European Conference on Computer Network Defense.

[3]  S. Nakamoto,et al.  Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System , 2008 .

[4]  D. Dittrich,et al.  New Directions in Peer-to-Peer Malware , 2008, 2008 IEEE Sarnoff Symposium.

[5]  Sven Dietrich,et al.  P2P as botnet command and control: A deeper insight , 2008, 2008 3rd International Conference on Malicious and Unwanted Software (MALWARE).

[6]  Christopher Krügel,et al.  Your botnet is my botnet: analysis of a botnet takeover , 2009, CCS.