Sensemaking following surprise in the cockpit—a re-framing problem

Re-framing is the process by which a person “fills the gap” between what is expected and what has been observed, that is, to try and make sense of what is going on following a surprise. It is an active and adaptive process guided by expectations, which are based on knowledge and experience. In this article, surprise situations in cockpit operations are examined by investigating the re-framing process. The results show difficulties that pilots have in re-framing following surprise, including the identification of subtle cues and managing uncertainties regarding automated systems, coping with multiple goals, tasks and narrow time frames and identifying an appropriate action. A crew-aircraft sensemaking model is presented, outlining core concepts of re-framing processes and sensemaking activities. Based on the findings, three critical areas are identified that deserve further attention to improve pilot abilities to cope with unexpected events; (1) identification of what enables and obstructs re-framing, (2) training to build frames and develop re-framing strategies and (3) control strategies as part of the re-framing process.

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