Computer Security Policies and Deontic Logic

With respect to condentiality, a computer security policy denes what information stored in a computer users have the permission to know. We propose to express these policies with an epistemic and deontic logic. In this context, con-dentiality is dened by the formula KA' ! RA' that could be read \if A knows ' then A should have the permission to know '". We provide a new possible-worlds semantics for the RA operator that depends on the security policy to be modeled. Finally, we express within our framework three examples of security policies.

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