Corporate governance, compensation consultants, and CEO pay levels

[1]  Shivaram Rajgopal,et al.  Frictions in the CEO Labor Market: The Role of Talent Agents in CEO Compensation* , 2012 .

[2]  Aditi Gupta,et al.  Executive Compensation, Compensation Consultants, and Shopping for Opinion: Evidence from the United Kingdom , 2010 .

[3]  Jun Yang,et al.  Inside the Black Box : The Role and Composition of Compensation Peer Groups * , 2008 .

[4]  Aditi Gupta,et al.  Executive Compensation, Compensation Consultants, and Shopping for Opinion: Evidence from the UK , 2010 .

[5]  Kevin J. Murphy,et al.  Executive Pay and 'Independent' Compensation Consultants , 2009 .

[6]  Alan D. Jagolinzer,et al.  Chief Executive Officer Equity Incentives and Accounting Irregularities , 2009 .

[7]  Ana M. Albuquerque,et al.  Peer Firms in Relative Performance Evaluation , 2009 .

[8]  Stephen A. Hillegeist,et al.  The Incentives of Compensation Consultants and CEO Pay , 2009 .

[9]  Michael L. Lemmon,et al.  Does the use of peer groups contribute to higher pay and less efficient compensation , 2008 .

[10]  David F. Larcker,et al.  On the Use of Instrumental Variables in Accounting Research , 2008 .

[11]  M. Conyon.  Compensation Consultants and Executive Pay: Evidence from the United States and the United Kingdom , 2008 .

[12]  Paul R Rosenbaum,et al.  Sensitivity Analysis for m‐Estimates, Tests, and Confidence Intervals in Matched Observational Studies , 2007, Biometrics.

[13]  Olubunmi Faleye,et al.  Classified Boards, Firm Value, and Managerial Entrenchment , 2007 .

[14]  Daniel Ferreira,et al.  A Theory of Friendly Boards , 2007 .

[15]  V. Laux.  Board Independence and CEO Turnover , 2006 .

[16]  Ronald W. Masulis,et al.  Agency Problems at Dual-Class Companies , 2006 .

[17]  Jeffrey L. Coles,et al.  Boards: Does One Size Fit All? , 2005 .

[18]  L. Bebchuk,et al.  Pay without Performance, The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation, Part IV: Going Forward , 2004 .

[19]  Eliezer M. Fich,et al.  Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors? , 2004 .

[20]  Joe Alper,et al.  The money men. , 2003, Nature biotechnology.

[21]  Andres Almazan,et al.  Entrenchment and Severance Pay in Optimal Governance Structures , 2003 .

[22]  L. Bebchuk,et al.  Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem , 2003 .

[23]  M. CyertRichard,et al.  Corporate Governance, Takeovers, and Top-Management Compensation , 2002 .

[24]  Praveen Kumar,et al.  Corporate Governance, Takeovers, and Top-Management Compensation: Theory and Evidence , 2002, Manag. Sci..

[25]  M. Klausner,et al.  Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value? Antitakeover Protection in Ipos , 2000 .

[26]  John E. Core,et al.  The Use of Equity Grants to Manage Optimal Equity Incentive Levels , 1999 .

[27]  D. Larcker,et al.  Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance 1 The financial sup , 1999 .

[28]  Canice Prendergast.  The Provision of Incentives in Firms , 1999 .

[29]  Simon Peck,et al.  Board Control, Remuneration Committees, and Top Management Compensation , 1998 .

[30]  Jonathan L. Johnson,et al.  Compensation Committee Composition as a Determinant of Ceo Compensation , 1998 .

[31]  Joseph F. Porac,et al.  Worth, words, and the justification of executive pay , 1997 .

[32]  Kenneth A. Borokhovich,et al.  CEO Contracting and Antitakeover Amendments , 1997 .

[33]  D. Yermack.  Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors , 1996 .

[34]  David F. Larcker,et al.  The Structure of Organizational Incentives , 1993 .

[35]  A. Riahi‐Belkaoui,et al.  An Analysis of the Use of Accounting and Market Measures of Performance, CEO Experience and Nature of the Deviation from the Analysts' Forecasts in CEO , 1993 .

[36]  Ross L. Watts,et al.  The Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate Financing, Dividend, and Compensation Policies , 1992 .

[37]  G. Crystal.  In Search of Excess: The Overcompensation of American Executives , 1991 .

[38]  Ulrich Derigs,et al.  Solving non-bipartite matching problems via shortest path techniques , 1988 .

[39]  D. Rubin,et al.  The central role of the propensity score in observational studies for causal effects , 1983 .

[40]  M. Allen.  Power and Privilege in the Large Corporation: Corporate Control and Managerial Compensation , 1981, American Journal of Sociology.

[41]  Dennis J. Kucinich,et al.  Committee on Oversight and Government Reform , 2012 .

[42]  C. Lewis.  The Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate Financing, Dividend, and Compensation Policies: Empirical Evidence for Large Electric Holding Companies , 2007 .

[43]  John M. Barron,et al.  Executive compensation. , 1990, Trustee : the journal for hospital governing boards.

[44]  David F. Larcker,et al.  AN ANALYSIS OF THE USE OF ACCOUNTING AND MARKET MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE IN EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION CONTRACTS , 1987 .