Reputable List Curation from Decentralized Voting

Abstract Token-curated registries (TCRs) are a mechanism by which a set of users are able to jointly curate a reputable list about real-world information. Entries in the registry may have any form, so this primitive has been proposed for use—and deployed—in a variety of decentralized applications, ranging from the simple joint creation of lists to helping to prevent the spread of misinformation online. Despite this interest, the security of this primitive is not well understood, and indeed existing constructions do not achieve strong or provable notions of security or privacy. In this paper, we provide a formal cryptographic treatment of TCRs as well as a construction that provably hides the votes cast by individual curators. Along the way, we provide a model and proof of security for an underlying voting scheme, which may be of independent interest. We also demonstrate, via an implementation and evaluation, that our construction is practical enough to be deployed even on a constrained decentralized platform like Ethereum.

[1]  Tommaso Gagliardoni,et al.  The Wonderful World of Global Random Oracles , 2018, IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch..

[2]  Yunlei Zhao,et al.  Interactive Zero-Knowledge with Restricted Random Oracles , 2006, TCC.

[3]  Bhaskar Krishnamachari,et al.  Token Curated Registries - A Game Theoretic Approach , 2018, ArXiv.

[4]  Véronique Cortier,et al.  SoK: A Comprehensive Analysis of Game-Based Ballot Privacy Definitions , 2015, 2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy.

[5]  Mihir Bellare,et al.  The Security of Triple Encryption and a Framework for Code-Based Game-Playing Proofs , 2006, EUROCRYPT.

[6]  Hideyuki Tanaka,et al.  Token-Curated Registry with Citation Graph , 2019, Ledger.

[7]  Markulf Kohlweiss,et al.  One-Out-of-Many Proofs: Or How to Leak a Secret and Spend a Coin , 2015, EUROCRYPT.

[8]  Yehuda Lindell,et al.  An Efficient Transform from Sigma Protocols to NIZK with a CRS and Non-programmable Random Oracle , 2015, TCC.

[9]  Feng Hao,et al.  A Smart Contract for Boardroom Voting with Maximum Voter Privacy , 2017, IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch..

[10]  Amos Fiat,et al.  How to Prove Yourself: Practical Solutions to Identification and Signature Problems , 1986, CRYPTO.

[11]  Aggelos Kiayias,et al.  Self-tallying Elections and Perfect Ballot Secrecy , 2002, Public Key Cryptography.

[12]  Ivan Visconti,et al.  A Transform for NIZK Almost as Efficient and General as the Fiat-Shamir Transform Without Programmable Random Oracles , 2016, IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch..

[13]  Hubert Ritzdorf,et al.  TLS-N: Non-repudiation over TLS Enablign Ubiquitous Content Signing , 2018, NDSS.

[14]  Ivan Damgård,et al.  Proofs of Partial Knowledge and Simplified Design of Witness Hiding Protocols , 1994, CRYPTO.

[15]  Robert H. Deng,et al.  Variations of Diffie-Hellman Problem , 2003, ICICS.

[16]  Fan Zhang,et al.  Town Crier: An Authenticated Data Feed for Smart Contracts , 2016, CCS.

[17]  Feng Hao,et al.  Anonymous voting by two-round public discussion , 2010, IET Inf. Secur..

[18]  Fan Zhang,et al.  DECO: Liberating Web Data Using Decentralized Oracles for TLS , 2020, CCS.

[19]  Josh Benaloh.  Verifiable secret-ballot elections , 1987 .

[20]  Ben Adida,et al.  Helios: Web-based Open-Audit Voting , 2008, USENIX Security Symposium.

[21]  Jens Groth,et al.  Efficient Maximal Privacy in Boardroom Voting and Anonymous Broadcast , 2004, Financial Cryptography.