Using Non‐Governmental Resources to Foster Regulatory Compliance

This article explores means by which non-governmental institutions and resources, both commercial and voluntay, may be enlisted in the interest of regulatory compliance. Following a discussion of non-governmental social control, it reviews the basic institutional forms of indirect governance through which third-party “co-production” of compliance might occur. It then discusses the basic issues which arise when certain public functions are delegated to or devolve upon private interests, and suggests safeguards which might be put in place to enhance the advantages and to minimize the adverse consequences of such devolution. The conclusion seeks to articulate basic principles for the mobilization of third parties in furtherance of compliance, and to encourage the idea of a more participative regulatoy process.

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