Explaining cooperation in the finitely repeated simultaneous and sequential prisoner’s dilemma game under incomplete and complete information

ABSTRACT Explaining cooperation in social dilemmas is a central issue in behavioral science, and the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) is the most frequently employed model. Theories assuming rationality and selfishness predict no cooperation in PDs of finite duration, but cooperation is frequently observed. We therefore build a model of how individuals in a finitely repeated PD with incomplete information about their partner’s preference for mutual cooperation decide about cooperation. We study cooperation in simultaneous and sequential PDs. Our model explains three behavioral regularities found in the literature: (i) the frequent cooperation in one-shot and finitely repeated N-shot games, (ii) cooperation rates declining over the course of the game, and (iii) cooperation being more frequent in the sequential PD than in the simultaneous PD.

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