The curse of the Black Swan

When unexpected and emotion-engaging events become Black Swans and carry an ‘extreme impact,’ this derives not so much those qualities or from their intrinsic size or importance as from reaction, or overreaction, they generate; but one that is often as extreme and unpredictable as the event itself. Most consequential development in human history, however, stems not from such events, but from changes in thinking and behavior that are gradual and often little-noticed as they occur. In addition, when an unexpected, emotion-grabbing event becomes a Black Swan, the response is likely to become internalized, and getting people to re-evaluate through sensible risk analysis and risk communication is extremely difficult. As part of this, events that are aberrations are often unwisely taken instead to be harbingers – and continue to be so even in the face of repeated disconfirming evidence. An examination of the 9/11 response in the US illustrates these points.

[1]  C. Hillebrand.  Chasing ghosts: the policing of terrorism , 2017 .

[2]  Daniel Yergin,et al.  The commanding heights : the battle between government and the marketplace that is remaking the modern world , 1998 .

[3]  Robert E. Melchers,et al.  Probabilistic Risk Assessment of Engineering Systems , 1997 .

[4]  Nassim Nicholas Taleb,et al.  The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable , 2007 .

[5]  M. Lessnoff.  Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy , 1979 .

[6]  A. Marshall.  Principles of Economics , .

[7]  B. Russett,et al.  No Clear and Present Danger: A Skeptical View of the United States Entry into World War II. , 1973 .

[8]  Janez Mayer.  The dark side : the inside story of how the War on Terror turned into a war on American ideals , 2008 .

[9]  M. Burton,et al.  Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe: Elites and democratic consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe: an overview , 1991 .

[10]  C. Sunstein.  Terrorism and Probability Neglect , 2003 .

[11]  G. Loewenstein,et al.  Dynamic processes in risk perception , 1990 .

[12]  J. Mueller,et al.  Capitalism, Democracy, and Ralph's Pretty Good Grocery , 1999 .

[13]  N. Rosenberg,et al.  How the West Grew Rich: The Economic Transforma-tion of the Industrial World , 1987 .

[14]  B. Fischhoff,et al.  Facts and Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk , 2005 .

[15]  James M Wilson,et al.  The Next Chapter. , 2015, Human gene therapy.

[16]  A. D. Nicholl,et al.  Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision , 1963 .

[17]  M. Stewart,et al.  Responsible Counterterrorism Policy , 2014 .

[18]  William Watts.  The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How the War on Terror Turned into a War on American Ideals by Jane Mayer - Doubleday, 2008 , 2008 .

[19]  Scott D. Sagan,et al.  The Origins of the Pacific War , 1988 .

[20]  C. Sunstein,et al.  Misfearing: A Reply , 2006 .

[21]  Leon J. Goldstein.  The End of History and the Last Man , 1993 .

[22]  Angus Burgin,et al.  The Great Persuasion: Reinventing Free Markets since the Depression , 2012 .

[23]  R. Heilbroner.  21st Century Capitalism , 1993 .

[24]  R. Schwing,et al.  Societal Risk Assessment , 1980 .

[25]  R. Hartwell.  A history of the Mont Pelerin society , 1995 .

[26]  Oliver Stuenkel.  The system worked: how the world stopped another Great Depression , 2015 .

[27]  B Fischhoff,et al.  Risk perception and communication unplugged: twenty years of process. , 1995, Risk analysis : an official publication of the Society for Risk Analysis.

[28]  P Slovic,et al.  Informing and educating the public about risk. , 1986, Risk analysis : an official publication of the Society for Risk Analysis.

[29]  B. Wright,et al.  Democracy In America , 2011 .

[30]  J. Mueller,et al.  Policy and opinion in the Gulf War , 1996 .

[31]  Andrew L. Stigler.  Terror, Security, and Money: Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and Costs of Homeland Security , 2012 .

[32]  James M. Burcalow.  INTELLIGENCE AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: Iraq, 9/11, and Misguided Reform , 2013 .

[34]  R. C. Schwing,et al.  Societal Risk Assessment: How Safe is Safe Enough? , 1980 .