Computational levels and conditional inference: Reply to Schroyens and Schaeken (2003)

This article is a reply to W. Schroyens and W. Schaeken's (2003; see record 2002-08431-014) critique of M. Oaksford, N. Chater, and J. Larkin's (2000; see record 2000-08540-005) conditional probability model (CP) of conditional inference. It is argued that their meta-analysis does not falsify CP because the evidence may bear on more than one computational level of explanation. Moreover, it is argued that CP provides a rational account of more of the data than W. Schroyens and W. Schaeken's mental models theory. Other points are also addressed. It is suggested that W. Schroyens and W. Schaeken's model and CP converge on the importance of probabilistic prior knowledge in conditional inference. This is consistent with the normative literature, which (like CP) treats conditionals in terms of subjective conditional probabilities.

[1]  Nick Chater,et al.  Probabilities and Pragmatics in Conditional Inference: Suppression and Order Effects , 2003 .

[2]  Nick Chater,et al.  Conditional Probability and the Cognitive Science of Conditional Reasoning , 2003 .

[3]  N. Chater,et al.  Optimal data selection: Revision, review, and reevaluation , 2003, Psychonomic bulletin & review.

[4]  David E Over,et al.  Conditionals and conditional probability. , 2003, Journal of experimental psychology. Learning, memory, and cognition.

[5]  W. Schroyens,et al.  A critique of Oaksford, Chater, and Larkin's (2000) conditional probability model of conditional reasoning. , 2003, Journal of experimental psychology. Learning, memory, and cognition.

[6]  Nick Chater,et al.  Fast, frugal, and rational: How rational norms explain behavior , 2003 .

[7]  P. Johnson-Laird.  Mental models and deduction , 2001, Trends in Cognitive Sciences.

[8]  N. Chater,et al.  The probabilistic approach to human reasoning , 2001, Trends in Cognitive Sciences.

[9]  G. d'Ydewalle,et al.  The processing of negations in conditional reasoning: A meta-analytic case study in mental model and/or mental logic theory , 2001 .

[10]  N Chater,et al.  Human rationality and the psychology of reasoning: where do we go from here? , 2001, British journal of psychology.

[11]  Walter Schaeken,et al.  Heuristic and analytic processes in propositional reasoning with negatives. , 2000, Journal of experimental psychology. Learning, memory, and cognition.

[12]  G. d'Ydewalle,et al.  Conditional reasoning with negations: Implicit and explicit affirmation or denial and the role of contrast classes , 2000 .

[13]  N Chater,et al.  Probabilities and polarity biases in conditional inference. , 2000, Journal of experimental psychology. Learning, memory, and cognition.

[14]  Jonathan St. B. T. Evans,et al.  The Role of Negation in Conditional Inference , 1999 .

[15]  David M. Riefer,et al.  Theoretical and empirical review of multinomial process tree modeling , 1999, Psychonomic bulletin & review.

[16]  Nick Chater,et al.  Rationality In An Uncertain World: Essays In The Cognitive Science Of Human Understanding , 1998 .

[17]  N. Chater,et al.  RATIONAL EXPLANATION OF THE SELECTION TASK , 1996 .

[18]  Jonathan Bennett.  Classifying Conditionals: The Traditional Way is Right , 1995 .

[19]  Nick Chater,et al.  Theories of reasoning and the computational explanation of everyday inference , 1995 .

[20]  Nick Chater,et al.  A rational analysis of the selection task as optimal data selection. , 1994 .

[21]  A. Garnham,et al.  Thinking and Reasoning , 1994 .

[22]  Keith Stenning,et al.  Reasoning theories and bounded rationality , 1993 .

[23]  N. Chater,et al.  Against Logicist Cognitive Science , 1991 .

[24]  John R. Anderson.  The Adaptive Character of Thought , 1990 .

[25]  N. Chater,et al.  Autonomy, implementation and cognitive architecture: A reply to Fodor and Pylyshyn , 1990, Cognition.

[26]  Zenon W. Pylyshyn,et al.  Computation and Cognition: Toward a Foundation for Cognitive Science , 1984 .

[27]  H. Putnam.  Mathematics, Matter and Method: The ‘corroboration’ of theories , 1979 .

[28]  I. Lakatos.  Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes , 1976 .

[29]  R. Swinburne,et al.  The Philosophy of Karl Popper , 1975 .

[30]  S. Guttenplan.  Mind and language , 1975 .

[31]  Imre Lakatos,et al.  Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge , 1972 .

[32]  I. Lakatos,et al.  Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge: Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes , 1970 .

[33]  P C Wason,et al.  Reasoning about a Rule , 1968, The Quarterly journal of experimental psychology.

[34]  J. Hintikka,et al.  Aspects of Inductive Logic. , 1968 .

[35]  B. Foss.  New Horizons in Psychology 1 , 1966 .

[36]  E. W. Adams,et al.  Probability and the Logic of Conditionals , 1966 .

[37]  W. Quine.  Methods of Logic , 1951 .

[38]  F. Ramsey.  The foundations of mathematics , 1932 .