Multi-input Functional Encryption Based Electronic Voting Scheme

As voting plays an important role in democratic society, both the privacy and verifiability of voting are particularly important in computer-supported voting system. In this paper, we propose a secret voting scheme that based on multi-input functional encryption. Compared with other traditional voting systems, our scheme not only can keep anonymity and receipt freeness while voting proceedings, but also can publicly verify the result of the voting for every voter. In addition, we prove that our scheme can keep secrecy and achieve verifiability by using a multi-input functional encryption.

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