Laudaij, Leplin, empirical equivalence and underdetermination

According to Larry Laudan and Jarrett Leplin, it is a received view among philosophers of science that (E) there are empirically equivalent rivals to any scientific theory, and that as a consequence, (U) theory choice is radically underdetermined by all possible evidence (L. Laudan and J. Leplin, 'Empirical Equivalence and Underdetermination', Journal of Philosophy, 88, 1991, pp. 449-72). Laudan and Leplin repudiate this view in its totality: they reject both E and the claim that E entails U. In addition, they seem to suggest that there are no arguments for U that do not employ E as a premiss. Thus the case for underdetermination is triply doomed: one of its premisses is false, the conclusion wouldn't follow even if the premiss were true, and there are no proposals for alternative avenues to the same conclusion.