An experimental investigation into the effects of information revelation in multi-attribute reverse auctions

Bid-takers in multi-attribute reverse auctions (MRA) are typically confronted with a myriad of information revelation options and must make decisions on which pieces of information to reveal to bidders and which ones to conceal. This study explores how the choice of different types and combinations of information can affect bidding behaviour and bidder perceptions in MRA. The results of a computer-based laboratory experiment suggest that by reducing the level of information asymmetry and using certain combinations of information a bid-taker can reduce bidder drop-out and spur the submission of high quality bids, i.e. bids that yield high levels of utility for the bid-taker.

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