Coordination rules in asymmetric social dilemmas: a comparison between public good dilemmas and resource dilemmas

Abstract The present study focuses on differences between Public Good Dilemmas and Resource Dilemmas. As members of a four-person group, subjects either played a one-trial Public Good Dilemma or a one-trial Resource Dilemma. In the Public Good Dilemma, members learned that they were endowed with a certain number of points and that they could obtain a bonus if as a group they could take more than 120 points. In the Resource Dilemma, members learned that they could take points from a certain source and that they could obtain a bonus if they would leave more than 120 points in this source. In experiments 1 and 2, asymmetry of endowments was induced: In the Public Good Dilemma, two members could give twice as many points as the other two, whereas in the Resource Dilemma, two members could take twice as many points as the other two. In experiment 3, asymmetry of interests was induced: All members could give/take an equal number of points, but two members would receive 33% of the bonus whereas the other two would receive 17%. The results of these experiments show that group members tend to coordinate their choice behavior differently in these two dilemma situations. Members playing a Public Good Dilemma tend to give in proportion to their endowments or interest position. Members playing a Resource Dilemma coordinate choice behavior in a way that minimizes differences in final outcomes.