How Career Concerns Influence Public Workers' Effort: Evidence from the Teacher Labor Market. Working Paper 40.
暂无分享,去创建一个
[1] K. Muralidharan,et al. Teacher Incentives in Developing Countries: Experimental Evidence from India. Working Paper 2008-13. , 2006 .
[2] J. Tirole,et al. The economics of career concerns, part I: Comparing information structures , 1999 .
[3] E. Fama. Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm Author ( s ) : , 2007 .
[4] Bengt Holmstrom,et al. Moral Hazard and Observability , 1979 .
[5] Cory Koedel,et al. Re-Examining the Role of Teacher Quality in the Educational Production Function. Working Paper 2007-03. , 2007 .
[6] Jeffrey D. Kubik,et al. Security Analysts' Career Concerns and Herding of Earnings Forecasts , 1998 .
[7] A. Ichino,et al. Biological Gender Differences, Absenteeism and the Earning Gap , 2006, SSRN Electronic Journal.
[8] Michael Hansen,et al. National Board Certification and Teachers' Career Paths: Does NBPTS Certification Influence How Long Teachers Remain in the Profession and Where They Teach , 2009, Education Finance and Policy.
[9] A. Leigh,et al. EXPLAINING THE DECLINE OF TEACHER APTITUDE IN THE UNITED STATES , 2004 .
[10] Kevin J. Murphy,et al. Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence , 1991, Journal of Political Economy.
[11] David N. Figlio,et al. Individual Teacher Incentives and Student Performance , 2006 .
[12] Susanna Loeb,et al. Who Leaves? Teacher Attrition and Student Achievement , 2008 .
[13] R. Murnane,et al. Do Teacher Absences Impact Student Achievement? Longitudinal Evidence From One Urban School District , 2007 .
[14] Helen F. Ladd,et al. Are Teacher Absences Worth Worrying About in the United States , 2009, Education Finance and Policy.
[15] Victor Lavy. Performance Pay and Teachers' Effort, Productivity and Grading Ethics , 2004 .
[16] E. Hanushek,et al. Teachers, Schools, and Academic Achievement , 1998 .
[17] Susan Johnson. Incentives for Teachers: What Motivates, what Matters , 1986 .
[18] George A. Akerlof,et al. The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism , 1970 .
[19] Alexander K. Koch,et al. Career Concerns Incentives: An Experimental Test , 2009 .
[20] Glenn Ellison,et al. Career Concerns of Mutual Fund Managers , 1998 .
[21] Gilat Levy. Careerist judges and the appeals process , 2005 .
[22] Eric A. Hanushek,et al. The Economics of Schooling: Production and Efficiency in Public Schools , 1986 .
[23] Jacob L. Vigdor. Teacher Salary Bonuses in North Carolina , 2008 .
[24] Jean Tirole,et al. The internal organization of government , 1994 .
[25] Victor Lavy. Evaluating the Effect of Teachers' Performance Incentives on Pupil Achievement , 2001 .
[26] P. Kuhn,et al. Incentives and Effort in the Public Sector: Have U.S. Education Reforms Increased Teachers' Work Hours? , 2004, SSRN Electronic Journal.
[27] D. Brewer. Principals and student outcomes: Evidence from U.S. high schools , 1993 .
[28] Mathias Dewatripont,et al. The Economics of Career Concerns, Part II: Application to Missions and Accountability of Government Agencies , 1999 .
[29] Paul R. Milgrom,et al. Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design , 1991 .
[30] Joseph G. Altonji,et al. Do Wages Rise with Job Seniority? A Reassessment , 1997 .
[31] S. Loeb,et al. Principal's Time Use and School Effectiveness , 2010, American Journal of Education.
[32] Howard Burton,et al. Fringe Benefits , 2020, Science and Pseudoscience.
[33] Sherrilyn M. Billger. Principals as Agents? Investigating Accountability in the Compensation and Performance of School Principals , 2007, SSRN Electronic Journal.
[34] E. Lazear. Speeding, Terrorism, and Teaching to the Test , 2006 .
[35] Michael H. Casson. Reducing Teacher Moral Hazard in the U.S. Elementary and Secondary Educational System through Merit-pay: An Application of the Principal–Agency Theory , 2007 .
[36] Helen F. Ladd. The Dallas School Accountability and Incentive Program: An Evaluation of its Impacts on Student Outcomes , 1996 .
[37] Dan Goldhaber,et al. Are Public Schools Really Losing Their Best? Assessing the Career Transitions of Teachers and Their Implications for the Quality of the Teacher Workforce. Working Paper 12. , 2007 .
[38] A. Mukherjee,et al. Sustaining Implicit Contracts When Agents Have Career Concerns: The Role of Information Disclosure , 2005 .
[39] Avinash Dixit,et al. # Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review , 2002 .
[40] Colin Green,et al. Worker Absence and Shirking: Evidence from Matched Teacher-School Data, Labour Economics Research Group (LERG) Discussion Paper Series, June 2005 , 2007 .
[41] Paco Martorell,et al. School Principals and School Performance , 2009 .
[42] Richard J. Murnane,et al. The Career Paths of Teachers: Implications for Teacher Supply and Methodological Lessons for Research. , 1988 .
[43] Canice Prendergast. The Provision of Incentives in Firms , 1999 .
[44] Ronald G. Ehrenberg,et al. School District Leave Policies, Teacher Absenteeism, and Student Achievement , 1989 .
[45] Matthew G. Springer,et al. Teacher performance pay: A review , 2007 .
[46] W. Evans,et al. Women, the labor market, and the declining relative quality of teachers , 2004 .
[47] Michael Waldman,et al. Enriching a Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics inside Firms , 1999, Journal of Labor Economics.
[48] Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective , 1999 .