Ownership and Management Issues Associated With Family Firm Performance and Company Objectives

Agency and stewardship theories are used to explore associations between ownership and management profiles and the performance and objectives of family firms. Using data from privately held family firms in the United Kingdom, a range of performance measures and objectives were examined. Multivariate regression analysis detected that closely held family firms did not report superior firm performance. The results show that the management rather than the ownership structure of a family firm was generally associated with selected firm-performance indicators and nonfinancial company objectives. Although family CEOs were associated with lower propensity to export, presented evidence generally fails to suggest that private family firms should avoid employing family members in management roles.

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