Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring

We show that the folk theorm with individually rational payoffs defined by pure strategies generically holds for a general N-player repeated game with private monitoring when the number of each player's signals is sufficiently large. No cheap talk communication device or public randomization device is necessary.

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