A Simulation of the Market for Offenses in Multiagent Systems: Is Zero Crime Rates Attainable?

The equilibrium of the market for offenses is studied by means of a multi-agent based simulation. The results show more detailed properties of the market's equilibrium compared to the theoretical results derived by Fender [8]. Some preliminary results are described.

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