The Impact of iPhone Exclusivity Arrangement on Demand for Smartphones

In this paper, we examine how an exclusivity agreement between Apple and wireless carriers in six developed countries affected the purchase of iPhones. Under this arrangement, one wireless carrier in each country became the exclusive distributor of the iPhone for a given period of time. The restriction would lead to a bounded choice set of consumers attached to non-exclusive carriers and thus would affect their choice of smartphone. To measure how this limited access to the iPhone would affect smartphone sales and consumer welfare, a structural model of consumer demand is developed and applied to a unique data set comprised of a panel data of mobile handset sales for a five-year period from 2008 through 2012 in the six countries considered. The model accounts for the possible endogeneity of the exclusivity duration, for heterogeneous consumer taste, and for variations in iPhone availability across consumers. The parameters estimated by this model suggest that the exclusivity arrangement ultimately resulted in a significant reduction in iPhone sales and an overall loss in the sale of all smartphones. Specifically, while it was estimated that the exclusivity arrangement would lead to a decrease in iPhone sales of approximately 26.2 million and an increase in the sale of other smartphones of only 15.1 million in the six countries. Our results also suggest that although the restricted availability of the iPhone may have led to a substantial reduction in consumer welfare, a revenue-sharing agreement between Apple and the wireless carriers may have mitigated the company's loss of profit.

[1]  David Besanko,et al.  Equilibrium incentives for exclusive dealing in a differentiated products oligopoly , 1993 .

[2]  M. Slade,et al.  Exclusive contracts and vertical restraints : empirical evidence and public policy , 2008 .

[3]  Marc Rysman,et al.  Dynamics of Consumer Demand for New Durable Goods , 2007 .

[4]  Helen Weeds,et al.  TV Wars: Exclusive Content and Platform Competition in Pay TV , 2012 .

[5]  Yutec Sun,et al.  The Value of Branding in Two-sided Platforms , 2013 .

[6]  B. Douglas Bernheim,et al.  Exclusive Dealing , 1996, Journal of Political Economy.

[7]  Y Joseph Lin,et al.  The Dampening-of-Competition Effect of Exclusive Dealing , 1990 .

[8]  Philippe Aghion,et al.  Contracts as a barrier to entry , 1987 .

[9]  David Besanko,et al.  Exclusive dealing in a spatial model of retail competition , 1994 .

[10]  W. P. Culbertson,et al.  The price of beer: Some evidence from interstate comparisons , 1991 .

[11]  Robin S. Lee Vertical Integration and Exclusivity in Two-Sided Markets , 2007 .

[12]  Robin S. Lee Vertical Integration and Exclusivity in Platform and Two-Sided Markets , 2013 .

[13]  Steven T. Berry,et al.  Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium , 1995 .

[14]  J. Mortimer Vertical Contracts in the Video Rental Industry , 2008 .

[15]  M. Whinston Exclusivity and Tying in U.S. v. Microsoft: What We Know, and Don't Know , 2001 .

[16]  Michael Sinkinson,et al.  Pricing and Entry Incentives with Exclusive Contracts: Evidence from Smartphones , 2014 .

[17]  M. Whinston,et al.  Exclusive Contracts and Protection of Investments , 1998 .

[18]  Benjamin E. Hermalin,et al.  Product Differentiation Through Exclusivity: Is There a One‐Market‐Power‐Rent Theorem? , 2013 .

[19]  Steven T. Berry Estimating Discrete-Choice Models of Product Differentiation , 1994 .

[20]  Upender Subramanian,et al.  Exclusive Handset Arrangements in the Wireless Industry: A Competitive Analysis , 2013, Mark. Sci..

[21]  Christodoulos Stefanadis,et al.  Selective Contracts, Foreclosure, and the Chicago School View* , 1998, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[22]  J. Asker,et al.  Diagnosing Foreclosure Due to Exclusive Dealing , 2004 .

[23]  Siva Viswanathan,et al.  Platform-based information goods: The economics of exclusivity , 2010, Decis. Support Syst..

[24]  Mara Lederman,et al.  Software Exclusivity and the Scope of Indirect Network Effects in the U.S. Home Video Game Market , 2007 .

[25]  Hal J. Singer,et al.  Why the iPhone Won't Last Forever and What the Government Should Do to Promote its Successor , 2010, J. Telecommun. High Technol. Law.

[26]  Aviv Nevo A Practitioner's Guide to Estimation of Random‐Coefficients Logit Models of Demand , 2000 .

[27]  J. Mark Ramseyer,et al.  Naked Exclusion: Reply , 2000 .

[28]  David de Meza,et al.  Exclusive Contracts Foster Relationship-Specific Investment , 2007 .

[29]  Ilya Segal,et al.  Naked Exclusion: Comment , 2000 .

[30]  Tim R. Sass,et al.  The competitive effects of exclusive dealing: Evidence from the U.S. beer industry , 2005 .

[31]  Ting Zhu,et al.  Wireless Carriers’ Exclusive Handset Arrangements: an Empirical Look at the iPhone , 2011 .

[32]  Naufel J. Vilcassim,et al.  Structural Demand Estimation with Varying Product Availability , 2008 .