论文信息 - Only a dictatorship is efficient

Only a dictatorship is efficient

In many, if not most, elections, several different seats must be filled, so that a group of candidates, or an assembly, is selected. Typically in these elections, voters cast their ballots on a seat-by-seat basis. We show that these seat-by-seat procedures are efficient only under extreme conditions.

Jean-Pierre Benoît | Lewis A. Kornhauser

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