Weaving Straw into Gold: Managing Organizational Tensions Between Standardization and Flexibility in Microfinance

This article explores how organizations balance the pressures to pursue efficiency through standardization with the need to remain responsive to local needs. The study combines rich ethnography with detailed loan data to show that both standardization and flexibility through relational ties provide substantial organizational benefits but also carry significant costs; thus, no strategy is inherently superior, and their coexistence generates the best results. Such coexistence, however, creates contradictions that must be managed. Here, I use microfinance as a strategic setting and gain analytic leverage from the random assignment across branches of loan officers who exhibit significant heterogeneity in rule enforcement styles: some enforce rules strictly, whereas others frequently bend them to respond to client needs. I find that loan officers with relational styles exercise discretion productively to enhance organizational performance. Yet their effectiveness is contingent on the presence of rule-enforcing peers, as evidenced by the significant underperformance of branches with a high concentration of officers of either type. In contrast, branches that contain discretionary diversity, or a balance between enforcement styles, perform best. This is not due to diversity per se, but because loan officers process decisions in local credit committees. Committees that contain discretionary diversity generate a productive tension that induces participants to justify decisions along broader organizational goals, thus maintaining a productive balance between standardization and flexibility. Implications for organizational theory and practice are discussed.

[1]  Ghazala Mansuri,et al.  A little at a time: the use of regularly scheduled repayments in microfinance programs , 2003 .

[2]  C. Sabel,et al.  The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity , 1984 .

[3]  L. Reed State of the Microcredit Summit Campaign Report 2011 , 2011 .

[4]  B. Uzzi,et al.  Social Structure and Competition in Interfirm Networks: The Paradox of Embeddedness , 1997 .

[5]  P. Ingram,et al.  Friendships among Competitors in the Sydney Hotel Industry1 , 2000, American Journal of Sociology.

[6]  P. Spicker,et al.  Understanding particularism , 1994 .

[7]  Jeffrey Pfeffer,et al.  Paradigm Development and Particularism: Journal Publication in Three Scientific Disciplines , 1977 .

[8]  Mustafa Emirbayer,et al.  What Is Agency?1 , 1998, American Journal of Sociology.

[9]  Soumyananda Dinda Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital and Economic Growth: A Productive Consumption Approach , 2007 .

[10]  John W. Meyer,et al.  Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony , 1977, American Journal of Sociology.

[11]  F. Thompson Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services , 1983 .

[12]  James N. Baron,et al.  Building the Iron Cage: Determinants of Managerial Intensity in the Early Years of Organizations , 1999 .

[13]  B. Uzzi,et al.  Embeddedness in the Making of Financial Capital: How Social Relations and Networks Benefit Firms Seeking Financing , 1999, The New Economic Sociology.

[14]  J. Coleman,et al.  Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital , 1988, American Journal of Sociology.

[15]  Daniel A. Levinthal,et al.  Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning , 2007 .

[16]  L. Edelman,et al.  Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law , 1992, American Journal of Sociology.

[17]  Martha S. Feldman,et al.  Resources in Emerging Structures and Processes of Change , 2004, Organ. Sci..

[18]  J. March,et al.  Organizational Learning , 2008 .

[19]  Simon Thompson,et al.  Universalism, selectivism and particularism , 1996 .

[20]  Susan S. Silbey,et al.  The sociological citizen: Pragmatic and relational regulation in law and organizations , 2011 .

[21]  B. Uzzi,et al.  The Sources and Consequences of Embeddedness for the Economic Performance of Organizations: The Network Effect , 1996 .

[22]  Roberto Rocha Coelho Pires,et al.  Promoting sustainable compliance: Styles of labour inspection and compliance outcomes in Brazil , 2008 .

[23]  B. Armendáriz,et al.  The Economics of Microfinance , 2006 .

[24]  Ramana Nanda,et al.  A Darker Side to Decentralized Banks: Market Power and Credit Rationing in SME Lending , 2011 .

[25]  James F. Wilson Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It , 1990 .

[26]  Richard Hogan,et al.  Insurgent Identities: Class, Community, and Protest in Paris from 1848 to the Commune. , 1996 .

[27]  M. Petersen,et al.  The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence from Small Business Data , 1994 .

[28]  Trond Petersen,et al.  The Opportunity Structure for Discrimination1 , 2004, American Journal of Sociology.

[29]  Dean S. Karlan,et al.  Teaching Entrepreneurship: Impact of Business Training on Microfinance Clients and Institutions , 2006, Review of Economics and Statistics.

[30]  A. Strauss,et al.  The discovery of grounded theory: strategies for qualitative research aldine de gruyter , 1968 .

[31]  Rodrigo Canales,et al.  Rule Breaking, Sociological Citizenship, and Organizational Contestation in Microfinance , 2010 .

[32]  James G. March,et al.  Organizational decision making: Understanding how decisions happen in organizations , 1996 .

[33]  C. Brodsky The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research , 1968 .

[34]  Christopher Uggen,et al.  The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedures as Rational Myth , 1999, American Journal of Sociology.

[35]  Charles F. Sabel,et al.  A Real-Time Revolution in Routines , 2005 .

[36]  Paul S. Adler,et al.  PERSPECTIVE - The Sociological Ambivalence of Bureaucracy: From Weber via Gouldner to Marx , 2012, Organ. Sci..

[37]  Jennifer A. Howard-Grenville The Persistence of Flexible Organizational Routines: The Role of Agency and Organizational Context , 2005, Organ. Sci..

[38]  Maggie Dugan,et al.  Donors succeed by making themselves obsolete : Compartamos taps financial markets in Mexico , 2005 .

[39]  Harold Alderman,et al.  Saving and economic shocks in rural Pakistan , 1996 .

[40]  G. Pisano,et al.  Disrupted Routines: Team Learning and New Technology Implementation in Hospitals , 2001 .

[41]  Michael J. Piore,et al.  Beyond Markets: Sociology, street-level bureaucracy, and the management of the public sector , 2011 .

[42]  James N. Baron,et al.  Labor Pains: Change in Organizational Models and Employee Turnover in Young, High‐Tech Firms1 , 2001, American Journal of Sociology.

[43]  J. Morduch The microfinance promise , 1999 .

[44]  T. Schelling The Strategy of Conflict , 1963 .

[45]  Paul Stoneman An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change . By Richard R. Nelson and Sidney G. Winter. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1982. Pp. xi, 437. $25.00. , 1986 .

[46]  Isabel Fernandez-Mateo,et al.  Cumulative Gender Disadvantage in Contract Employment1 , 2009, American Journal of Sociology.

[47]  G. Zuckerman,et al.  The Greatest Trade Ever: The Behind-the-Scenes Story of How John Paulson Defied Wall Street and Made Financial History , 2009 .

[48]  J. Morduch,et al.  Microfinance Meets the Market , 2008 .

[49]  Michael X Cohen,et al.  Routines and Other Recurring Action Patterns of Organizations: Contemporary Research Issues , 1996 .

[50]  Hal R. Varian,et al.  MONITORING AGENTS WITH OTHER AGENTS , 1989 .

[51]  M. Feldman Organizational Routines as a Source of Continuous Change , 2000 .

[52]  M. Haller,et al.  Varieties of Police Behavior: The Management of Law and Order in Eight Communities , 1969 .

[53]  R. Dawes Judgment under uncertainty: The robust beauty of improper linear models in decision making , 1979 .

[54]  R. Dawes,et al.  Heuristics and Biases: Clinical versus Actuarial Judgment , 2002 .

[55]  Carol A. Heimer Competing institutions: Law, medicine, and family in neonatal intensive care , 1999 .

[56]  Rodrigo Canales,et al.  Rule bending, sociological citizenship, and organizational contestation in microfinance: Rule bending in microfinance , 2011 .

[57]  Charles Heckscher,et al.  The firm as a collaborative community : reconstructing trust in the knowledge economy , 2009 .

[58]  T. Parsons,et al.  Toward a General Theory of Action , 1952 .

[59]  James N. Baron,et al.  The Road Taken: Origins and Evolution of Employment Systems in Emerging Companies , 1996 .

[60]  Isabel Fernandez-Mateo,et al.  When it Doesn ’ t Pay to Stay : Cumulative Gender Disadvantage in Contract Employment , 2007 .

[61]  A. Edmondson Speaking Up in the Operating Room: How Team Leaders Promote Learning in Interdisciplinary Action Teams , 2003 .

[62]  S. Coslovsky,et al.  Relational regulation in the Brazilian Ministério Publico: The organizational basis of regulatory responsiveness , 2011 .

[63]  P. Blau The Dynamics Of Bureaucracy , 1955 .

[64]  P. Adler Market, Hierarchy, and Trust: The Knowledge Economy and the Future of Capitalism , 2001 .

[65]  Rodrigo Canales,et al.  A Matter of (Relational) Style: Loan Officer Coherence and Consistency in Contract Enforcement in Microfinance* , 2012 .

[66]  Ruthanne Huising,et al.  The Sociological Citizen: Recognizing Relational Interdependence in Law and Organizations , 2008 .

[67]  Roger V. Gould,et al.  Insurgent Identities: Class, Community, and Protest in Paris from 1848 to the Commune. , 1996 .

[68]  Emily Erikson,et al.  Malfeasance and the Foundations for Global Trade: The Structure of English Trade in the East Indies, 1601–18331 , 2006, American Journal of Sociology.

[69]  Kevin J. Murphy,et al.  Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm , 1997 .

[70]  Dean Karlan,et al.  Microfinance Games , 2006 .

[71]  M. Feldman,et al.  Reconceptualizing Organizational Routines as a Source of Flexibility and Change , 2003 .

[72]  Erica Field,et al.  REPAYMENT FREQUENCY AND DEFAULT IN MICROFINANCE: EVIDENCE FROM INDIA , 2008 .

[73]  Carol A. Heimer Doing Your Job and Helping Your Friends: Universalistic Norms about Obligations to Particular Others in Networks , 1992 .

[74]  John K. Maniha Universalism and Particularism in Bureaucratizing Organizations. , 1975 .

[75]  Peter J. May,et al.  Reconsidering Styles of Regulatory Enforcement: Patterns in Danish Agro-Environmental Inspection , 2000 .

[76]  Leora F. Klapper,et al.  The Ability of Banks to Lend to Informationally Opaque Small Businesses , 2001 .

[77]  Jeffrey L. Bradach Using the Plural Form in the Management of Restaurant Chains , 1997 .

[78]  J. Morduch Poverty and Vulnerability , 1994 .

[79]  B. A. D. Aghion,et al.  On the design of a credit agreement with peer monitoring , 1999 .

[80]  P. Bearman,et al.  Desertion As Localism: Army Unit Solidarity and Group Norms in the U.S. Civil War , 1991 .

[81]  Jonathan Morduch,et al.  The Microfinance Schism , 1998 .

[82]  Joseph E. Stiglitz,et al.  Peer Monitoring and Credit Markets , 1990 .

[83]  Ruthanne Huising,et al.  The “sociological citizen” relational interdependence in law and organizations , 2009 .

[84]  P. Adler,et al.  Two Types of Bureaucracy: Enabling and Coercive , 1996 .

[85]  Amar Bhidé,et al.  A Call for Judgment: Sensible Finance for a Dynamic Economy , 2010 .

[86]  Susan S. Silbey,et al.  Common Knowledge and Ideological Critique: The Significance of Knowing That the 'Haves' Come Out Ahead , 1999 .