Oligopoly

This document (of 291 pages) comprises the proceedings of a roundtable on competition policy in oligopoly industries, held at the OECD in May 1999. Outright collusion is illegal and actively prosecuted in all OECD countries, but what should competition authorities do about markets in which competitors manage to sustain a collusive outcome without an explicit agreement? When does the presence of closely parallel behaviour ("conscious parallelism") amount to collusion? Many countries require a showing of more than just parallel behaviour - in addition certain "plus factors" must be shown - but what should these plus factors be? Some countries attempt to control tacit collusion by prosecuting so-called "facilitating practices", such as advance notice of price changes, meeting competition clauses or base point pricing. Should competition authorities have the right to prohibit mergers which merely create the conditions under which tacit collusion can arise? This document consists of an executive summary and background paper by the Secretariat, together with 14 delegation submissions and a summary of the oral discussion.

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