Passive and Active Combined Attacks: Combining Fault Attacks and Side Channel Analysis

Side-channel attacks have been deeply studied for years to ensure the tamper resistance of embedded implementations. Analysis are most of the time focused either on passive attack (side channel attack) or on active attacks (fault attack). In this article, a combination of both attacks is presented. It is named PACA for Passive and Active Combined Attacks. This new class of attacks allows us to recover the secret key with only one curve of leakages. Practical results on a secure implementation of RSA have been obtained and are presented here. Finally, a new kind of infective methodology is defined and countermeasures to counteract this type of analysis are introduced.

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