Are There Enough Decoy States to Ensure Key Secrecy in Quantum Cryptography?

The decoy state method has been proposed to detect a photon number splitting (PNS) attack. Today, the decoy state method is considered to be an almost universal method for proving the secrecy of quantum cryptography protocols and calculating the length of a secret key. In this paper, it is shown that there exist attacks, for example, a beam splitting (BS) attack, to which the decoy state method turns out to be insensitive. The decoy state method is oriented to the detection of changes in the photocount statistics of information states and decoy states under a PNS attack. Under a BS attack, the photocount statistics is not changed. As a result, the decoy state method significantly overestimates the length of the key. Thus, the decoy state method is not a universal method that allows the detection of various attacks. Apparently, due to a large number of publications on the decoy state method, a widespread opinion has been formed that this method is universal. This fact has led to attempts to adopt this method as an international standard in quantum cryptography, which is clearly premature.