Paradigmatic Experiments: the Dictator Game

Recent experiments with the Dictator Game (and the ensuing discussions) have been affected by considerable confusion regarding the purpose of this design. A common complaint is that the design gives rise to fragile regularities and therefore is of little use for theory-testing. We take issue with this view, and instead argue that the Dictator Game is potentially a very useful tool for experimental game theory, if properly used. It is particularly useful for investigating social norms, but economists have failed to take advantage of the Dictator Game because they still lack an adequate theory of norms.

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