Counterinsurgency Through Civil Infrastructure Networks

We investigate opportunities and risks to counterinsurgency (sometimes referred to as COIN) that are inherent in the civil networks surrounding infrastructure projects. It is argued here that a) successful counter-insurgency largely comprises the ‘engineering’ of robust and trusted civil networks that are capable of re-channelling insurgent designs; and b) introduction of externalized-exclusive control networks poses a significant risk to such network development. In this conceptual paper, we propose a number of network models, each hypothesizing a risk and / or opportunity. These models will be tested and refined using a case study methodology that draws on documentary evidence and interviews with subject matter experts. We propose two fundamental relationships: Coordination by rule and control (CRC), and; Collaboration by social influence (CSI). CRC is based on mechanical (rule and time based) structures, while CSI is based on organic (informal, trusted and shared aware) social networks. We posit that COIN is primarily a CSI interaction / exchange that can be supported (but also obstructed) by CRC. We therefore propose that the design of successful COIN operations must adhere to the hybrid notion providing an interface between CRC and CSI.