Principles for Entity Authentication

We study the roles of message components in authentication protocols. In particular, we investigate how a certain component contributes to the task of achieving entity authentication. To this aim, we isolate a core set of roles that enables us to extract general principles that should be followed to avoid attacks. We then formalize these principles in terms of rules for protocol parties and we prove that protocols designed according to these rules will achieve entity authentication.

[1]  Roger M. Needham,et al.  Using encryption for authentication in large networks of computers , 1978, CACM.

[2]  Robin Milner,et al.  On Observing Nondeterminism and Concurrency , 1980, ICALP.

[3]  Roger M. Needham,et al.  Authentication revisited , 1987, OPSR.

[4]  Martín Abadi,et al.  A logic of authentication , 1989, Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. A. Mathematical and Physical Sciences.

[5]  Li Gong,et al.  Reasoning about belief in cryptographic protocols , 1990, Proceedings. 1990 IEEE Computer Society Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy.

[6]  Pierre Bieber,et al.  A logic of communication in hostile environment , 1990, [1990] Proceedings. The Computer Security Foundations Workshop III.

[7]  E. Snekkenes.  Roles in cryptographic protocols , 1992, Proceedings 1992 IEEE Computer Society Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy.

[8]  Simon S. Lam,et al.  A semantic model for authentication protocols , 1993, Proceedings 1993 IEEE Computer Society Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy.

[9]  Ulf Carlsen.  Generating formal cryptographic protocol specifications , 1994, Proceedings of 1994 IEEE Computer Society Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy.

[10]  Martín Abadi,et al.  Prudent engineering practice for cryptographic protocols , 1994, Proceedings of 1994 IEEE Computer Society Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy.

[11]  Ross J. Anderson,et al.  Programming Satan's Computer , 1995, Computer Science Today.

[12]  Jan van Leeuwen,et al.  Computer Science Today , 1995, Lecture Notes in Computer Science.

[13]  Dieter Gollmann.  What do we mean by entity authentication? , 1996, Proceedings 1996 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy.

[14]  Gavin Lowe,et al.  Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol Using FDR , 1996, Softw. Concepts Tools.

[15]  Alfred Menezes,et al.  Handbook of Applied Cryptography , 2018 .

[16]  Dieter Gollmann,et al.  A fair non-repudiation protocol , 1996, Proceedings 1996 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy.

[17]  William Stallings.  Practical cryptography for data internetworks , 1996 .

[18]  Gavin Lowe,et al.  Casper: a compiler for the analysis of security protocols , 1997, Proceedings 10th Computer Security Foundations Workshop.

[19]  Martín Abadi,et al.  A calculus for cryptographic protocols: the spi calculus , 1997, CCS '97.

[20]  John A. Clark,et al.  A survey of authentication protocol literature: Version 1.0 , 1997 .

[21]  Gavin Lowe,et al.  A hierarchy of authentication specifications , 1997, Proceedings 10th Computer Security Foundations Workshop.

[22]  Steve A. Schneider,et al.  Formal analysis of a non-repudiation protocol , 1998, Proceedings. 11th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (Cat. No.98TB100238).

[23]  Martín Abadi,et al.  A Calculus for Cryptographic Protocols: The spi Calculus , 1999, Inf. Comput..

[24]  Joshua D. Guttman,et al.  Strand Spaces: Proving Security Protocols Correct , 1999, J. Comput. Secur..

[25]  Paul Syverson.  Towards a Strand Semantics for Authentication Logic , 1999 .

[26]  F. Javier Thayer Fábrega,et al.  Strand spaces: proving security protocols correct , 1999 .

[27]  Paul Syvreson.  Towards a Strand Semantics for Authentication Logic , 1999, MFPS.

[28]  Roberto Gorrieri,et al.  Non Interference for the Analysis of Cryptographic Protocols , 2000, ICALP.

[29]  Gavin Lowe,et al.  How to prevent type flaw attacks on security protocols , 2000, Proceedings 13th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop. CSFW-13.

[30]  Paul F. Syverson,et al.  The Logic of Authentication Protocols , 2000, FOSAD.

[31]  Andrew D. Gordon,et al.  Authenticity by typing for security protocols , 2001, Proceedings. 14th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 2001..

[32]  Martín Abadi,et al.  Secrecy Types for Asymmetric Communication , 2001, FoSSaCS.

[33]  Lawrence C. Paulson,et al.  Relations Between Secrets: Two Formal Analyses of the Yahalom Protocol , 2001, J. Comput. Secur..

[34]  Martín Abadi,et al.  Analyzing security protocols with secrecy types and logic programs , 2002, POPL '02.

[35]  Andrew D. Gordon,et al.  Types and effects for asymmetric cryptographic protocols , 2002, Proceedings 15th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop. CSFW-15.

[36]  John C. Mitchell,et al.  A Compositional Logic for Proving Security Properties of Protocols , 2003, J. Comput. Secur..

[37]  Andrew D. Gordon,et al.  Types and effects for asymmetric cryptographic protocols , 2004 .

[38]  Rajeev Alur,et al.  A Temporal Logic of Nested Calls and Returns , 2004, TACAS.