Structural Representations and the Brain

In Representation Reconsidered, William Ramsey suggests that the notion of structural representation is posited by classical theories of cognition, but not by the ‘newer accounts’ (e.g. connectionist modeling). I challenge the assertion about the newer accounts. I argue that the newer accounts also posit structural representations; in fact, the notion plays a key theoretical role in the current computational approaches in cognitive neuroscience. The argument rests on a close examination of computational work on the oculomotor system. 1 Introduction 2 Structural Representation 3 Ramsey's Argument 4 A Brief Review of Computational Work on Oculomotor Memory 5 The Memory Network as Structural Representation 6 Objection 1: The Memory States are not Internal Representations 7 Objection 2: The Memory States are not Real Representations 8 Summary 1 Introduction 2 Structural Representation 3 Ramsey's Argument 4 A Brief Review of Computational Work on Oculomotor Memory 5 The Memory Network as Structural Representation 6 Objection 1: The Memory States are not Internal Representations 7 Objection 2: The Memory States are not Real Representations 8 Summary