论文信息 - QUASI-CORES IN A MONETARY ECONOMY WITH NONCONVEX PREFERENCES

QUASI-CORES IN A MONETARY ECONOMY WITH NONCONVEX PREFERENCES

Abstract : A model of a pure exchange economy is investigated without the usual assumption of convex preference sets for the participating traders. The concept of core, taken from the theory of games, is applied to show that if there are sufficiently many participants, the economy as a whole will possess a solution that is sociologically stable--i.e., that cannot profitably be upset by any coalition of traders.

L. Shapley | M. Shubik

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