Complimentary Return-Freight Insurance Serves as Quality Signal or Noise?

In order to decrease the consumer return transaction cost, e-commerce platform Alibaba invited an insurance company to develop a new type of insurance to compensate consumers for returns, which is called return-freight insurance. The new insurance has resulted in online return's explosive growth. However, some online retailers still choose to offer complimentary return-freight insurance to signal their products' quality. Using signaling theory, we build a conceptual economic model to explore what kind of online retailer should adopt this strategy under incomplete information. Based on the fact that each product's return probability, profit, and insurance compensation are different, our main results show the separating equilibria, where only high-quality online retailers will offer complimentary return-freight insurance. Interestingly, return-freight insurance profit and compensation play different roles in the signal effect. The insurance premium plays a deep role while the compensation plays at the surface, because consumers could only observe the compensation when purchasing.

[1]  Wenli Li,et al.  Design for the pricing strategy of return-freight insurance based on online product reviews , 2017, Electron. Commer. Res. Appl..

[2]  Giri Kumar Tayi,et al.  Research Note - Investigating Firm Strategies on Offering Consumer-Customizable Products , 2015, Inf. Syst. Res..

[3]  Ted O’Donoghue,et al.  The Nature of Risk Preferences: Evidence from Insurance Choices , 2012, Social Science Research Network.

[4]  Bruce McWilliams,et al.  Money-Back Guarantees: Helping the Low-Quality Retailer , 2012, Manag. Sci..

[5]  Raquel Benbunan-Fich,et al.  Signaling theory and information asymmetry in online commerce , 2012, Inf. Manag..

[6]  Stanley E. Griffis,et al.  The customer consequences of returns in online retailing: An empirical analysis , 2012 .

[7]  Raymond Y. K. Lau,et al.  Text mining and probabilistic language modeling for online review spam detection , 2012, TMIS.

[8]  Jeffrey D. Shulman,et al.  Optimal Reverse Channel Structure for Consumer Product Returns , 2010, Mark. Sci..

[9]  Scott A. Fay,et al.  Managing Service Expectations in Online Markets: A Signaling Theory of E-tailer Pricing and Empirical Tests , 2010 .

[10]  Lu Hsiao,et al.  Returns Policy and Quality Risk in E-Business , 2010 .

[11]  Lawrence Ang,et al.  Lemons on the Web: A signalling approach to the problem of trust in Internet commerce , 2005 .

[12]  Samar K. Mukhopadhyay,et al.  Optimal return policy and modular design for build-to-order products , 2005 .

[13]  Stacy L. Wood Remote Purchase Environments: The Influence of Return Policy Leniency on Two-Stage Decision Processes , 2001 .

[14]  A. Rao,et al.  No Pain, No Gain: A Critical Review of the Literature on Signaling Unobservable Product Quality , 2000 .

[15]  K. Srinivasan,et al.  Signaling Quality with a Money-Back Guarantee: The Role of Transaction Costs , 1995 .

[16]  Sanford J. Grossman The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality , 1981, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[17]  Geoffrey Heal,et al.  Guarantees and Risk-Sharing , 1977 .

[18]  S. Madnick,et al.  MIT Sloan School of Management , 2004 .