Pragmatic reasoning from multiple points of view: A response

In our response we consider several broad sets of issues raised in the commentaries on our target article. We provide an elaboration of the general theory of pragmatic reasoning schemas and of the mechanisms posited to explain perspective effects and other contextual influences on reasoning. We consider the strengths and limitations of a number of alternative proposals offered by the commentators. Finally, we discuss possible links between pragmatic schemas and more elementary "building blocks" for human reasoning.

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