Network-Attack-Resilient Intrusion-Tolerant SCADA for the Power Grid

As key components of the power grid infrastructure, Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are likely to be targeted by nation-state-level attackers willing to invest considerable resources to disrupt the power grid. We present Spire, the first intrusion-tolerant SCADA system that is resilient to both system-level compromises and sophisticated network-level attacks and compromises. We develop a novel architecture that distributes the SCADA system management across three or more active sites to ensure continuous availability in the presence of simultaneous intrusions and network attacks. A wide-area deployment of Spire, using two control centers and two data centers spanning 250 miles, delivered nearly 99.999% of all SCADA updates initiated over a 30-hour period within 100ms. This demonstrates that Spire can meet the latency requirements of SCADA for the power grid.

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