Die Durchsetzung sozialer Normen in Low-Cost und High-Cost Situationen / Enforcement of Social Norms in Low-Cost and High-Cost Situations

Zusammenfassung In Feldstudien konnte häufig mittels der Low-Cost Hypothese gezeigt werden, dass normkonformes Verhalten von den dafür aufzuwendenden Kosten abhängt. Doch die Gültigkeit der Low-Cost Hypothese ist bei der Durchsetzung sozialer Normen bislang wenig erforscht. In unserer Studie werden diese kollektiven Güter zweiter Ordnung anhand nachbarschaftlicher Kontrollen analysiert. Es werden Daten einer postalischen Befragung von 631 Personen in Leipzig aus dem Jahr 2001 ausgewertet. Der Zusammenhang zwischen der Befürwortung sozialer Kontrollen und der Bereitschaft, soziale Kontrollen zu dulden, sinkt mit steigenden Kosten der zu duldenden Kontrollen. Zudem lässt sich die Logik der Low-Cost Hypothese auf andere soziologische Konstrukte übertragen: Die Wirkung von Kriminalitätsfurcht und Autoritarismus ist umso weniger relevant für die Duldung sozialer Kontrollen, je höher die Kosten dafür werden. Unsere Befunde demonstrieren somit die Gültigkeit der Low-Cost Hypothese im Zusammenhang mit kollektiven Gütern zweiter Ordnung. Summary Field studies show that normative behavior depends on the costs of obeying the norm. This effect is known as the low-cost hypothesis. However, does the enforcement of social norms also depend on the costs of enforcing the norm? So far, there has been little research on the validity of the low-cost hypothesis for these so-called “second order collective goods.” In our work, enforcement of social norms is studied by means of analyzing social control in neighborhoods. We use data from 631 respondents in a mail survey conducted in 2001 in Leipzig, Germany. Logistic regression models reveal that the strength of the relationship between the general approval of social control and the willingness to tolerate social control personally decreases with the increasing costs of tolerating these control activities. In addition, we transfer the logic of the low-cost hypothesis to other sociological constructs: The effect of fear of crime and the effect of authoritarianism on the tolerance of social control decreases with the increasing costs of these control activities. Our empirical findings confirm the low-cost hypothesis for the production of second-order collective goods.

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