On the Epistemic Value of Reputation

In this paper we want to explore the epistemological relevance and value of reputation understood as evaluative social information. Using reputation to classify and assess an agent or an item can be epistemologically useful in the absence or – as is especially relevant today – overabundance of information. However, in order to be and remain epistemically useful and ethically just it has to be open to constant scrutiny and revision. We will introduce a model of rational consensus as an example for the rational use of reputation for epistemic purpose before analyzing different reputational tools on the Web. We will conclude our paper with a critical comment on the potential danger of using social information to evaluate information and knowledge claims, resp. to warn from epistemic injustices on the Web and elsewhere. 1: Introduction What is that scarlet piece of tissue in the shape of an A sewn on Hester Prynne’s gown in Nathaniel Hawthorne’s masterpiece The scarlet letter? Is it a symbol of her sin, a “badge of shame”, an indelible sign of her community’s contempt? Is it a cruel reminder of her past, a succinct history of her misdeeds? Imagine that in the same colonial New England village, you do not have just a badge for the poor Hester, but each member of the community wears a letter that represents some past records of its owner. We can also imagine sets of identical badges worn by members of the community who have similar records: sinners, heroes, drunkards... Imagine that the elders of the community have the right to attach these labels to the villagers. Their judgments, based on their purported wisdom, become an easy way for the villagers to dispose of a basic classification of social types within the community that will allow them to manage their relations with others, to make inferences and predictions about their behavior, that is, construct a basic “social map” that will help them orient in their society. Morally this may be questionable, but epistemologically it can be useful. We want to explore in this paper, the epistemic value of this type of social information, that is, reputation, while being aware of the ethical and political problems that might come with using it for epistemic purpose. Using the judgment on past records to classify an agent or an item can be epistemologically useful in the absence or — as is especially relevant today — overabundance of information. But it has to be and remain open to constant scrutiny and revision to be epistemically useful and ethically just. 2: Reputation as evaluative social information Reputation is a special kind of social information: it is social information about the value of people, systems and processes that release information. We want to explore here the relationship between this special form of social information – that implies an evaluative stance – and the processes of knowledge organization (KO) and evaluation. More precisely, we want to argue not only that (1) we make use of other people’s reputations to evaluate information, but also (2) within systems, like the Web, that make