论文信息 - Pure equilibria of repeated games with public observation

Pure equilibria of repeated games with public observation

The set of payoffs associated to pure uniform equilibria of a repeated game with public observation is characterized in terms of the one shot-game. The key of the result is first, a study of the effect of undetectable deviations and second, the definition of new types of punishments using approachability techniques.

Tristam Tomala

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