Universal Interactive Preferences

We prove that a universal preference type space exists under much more general conditions than those postulated by [1] for a large class of preferences beyond [4]. To wit, it is enough that preferences can be encoded by a countable collection of continuous functionals, while the preferences themselves need not necessarily be continuous or regular, like, e.g., in the case of lexicographic preferences. The proof relies on a far-reaching generalization of a method developed by [3]. The full statements and proofs are provided in [2].

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