Experimental Investigation of Supplier-Retailer Contracts: The Wholesale Price Contract

We examine decision making in a simple supplier-retailer wholesale price contract in the experimental economics laboratory. We observe wholesale prices and order quantities below the game-theoretical predictions. The supply chain's efficiency is as predicted but profits are more equitably allocated. Cette etude en economie experimentale examine les contrats de prix en gros negocies entre un detaillant et un vendeur. Nous observons que les prix et les quantites negocies sont en dessous des previsions tirees du modele retenue en theorie des jeux. Les resultats experimentaux indiquent que l'efficacite de la chaine d'approvisionnement est inferieur a 100 % tel que predit par le modele. Par ailleurs, les profits sont alloues de facon plus equitable que l'allocation predite par le modele.

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