Risk Taking in Selection Contests

We study selection contests in which the strategic variable is degree of risk rather than amount of effort. The selection efficiency of such contests is examined. We show that the selection efficiency of a contest may be improved by limiting the competition in two ways; a) by having a small number of contestants, and b) by restricting contestant quality. The results may contribute to the understanding of phenomena like promotion processes in large firms, selection of fund managers and research tournaments.

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