论文信息 - On games with identical equilibrium payoffs

On games with identical equilibrium payoffs

Summary. This paper compares the sets of Nash, coalition- proof Nash and strong Nash equilibrium payoffs of normal form games which are closely related. We propose sufficient conditions for equivalent or closely related games to have identical sets of equilibrium payoffs.

Indrajit Ray | I. Ray

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