When the state does not play dice: aggressive audit strategies foster tax compliance
暂无分享,去创建一个
[1] L. Mittone. Dynamic behaviour in tax evasion: An experimental approach , 2006 .
[2] Sebastian Kube,et al. The Interaction of Legal and Social Norm Enforcement , 2010, SSRN Electronic Journal.
[3] F. Guala. The Methodology of Experimental Economics: Bibliography , 2005 .
[4] Sanjiv Erat,et al. White lies , 2010, Manag. Sci..
[5] J. Alm. Measuring, explaining, and controlling tax evasion: lessons from theory, experiments, and field studies , 2012 .
[6] M. Johannesson,et al. Promises, Threats and Fairness , 2004 .
[7] Martin Strobel,et al. Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments , 2002 .
[8] U. Fischbacher,et al. Are People Conditionally Cooperative? Evidence from a Public Goods Experiment , 2001 .
[9] L. Sherman. Police Crackdowns: Initial and Residual Deterrence , 1990, Crime and Justice.
[10] Rupert Sausgruber,et al. TESTING ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES IN THE FIELD: THREAT, MORAL APPEAL AND SOCIAL INFORMATION , 2013 .
[11] J. Alm,et al. Using Laboratory Experiments in Public Economics , 2007, National Tax Journal.
[12] L. Mittone. Subjective versus objective probability: results from seven experiments on fiscal evasion , 1997 .
[13] Agnar Sandmo,et al. Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis , 1972 .
[14] Regulatory performance of audit tournaments and compliance observability , 2016 .
[15] T. N. Srinivasan,et al. Tax evasion: A model , 1973 .
[16] N. Jacquemet,et al. Dynamic effects of enforcement on cooperation , 2018, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.
[17] E. Fehr,et al. Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments , 1999, SSRN Electronic Journal.
[18] J. Abeler,et al. Preferences for Truth-Telling , 2016, Econometrica.
[19] J. Slemrod,et al. Evidence of the invisible: toward a credibility revolution in the empirical analysis of tax evasion and the informal economy , 2012 .
[20] Erich Kirchler,et al. Why Pay Taxes? A Review of Tax Compliance Decisions , 2007 .
[21] Shlomo Yitzhaki,et al. Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis , 1974 .
[22] M. Villeval,et al. Tax Evasion and Social Interactions , 2004, SSRN Electronic Journal.
[23] K. Gërxhani,et al. Tax evasion and income source: A comparative experimental study , 2006 .
[24] Mark A. R. Kleiman,et al. When Brute Force Fails: How to Have Less Crime and Less Punishment , 2009 .
[25] J. Baldry. Tax evasion is not a gamble: A report on two experiments , 1986 .
[26] Luigi Mittone,et al. Sequences of audits, tax compliance, and taxpaying strategies , 2009 .
[27] Petra E. Todd,et al. A Theory of Optimal Random Crackdowns , 2010 .
[28] J. List,et al. The Behavioralist as Tax Collector: Using Natural Field Experiments to Enhance Tax Compliance , 2017 .
[29] H. Robben,et al. Tax Evasion: An Experimental Approach , 2010 .
[30] U. Fischbacher,et al. Are People Conditionally Cooperative? Evidence from a Public Goods Experiment , 2001 .
[31] Fabio Galeotti,et al. The efficiency of crackdowns: a lab-in-the-field experiment in public transportations , 2015, Theory and Decision.
[32] Scott M. Gilpatric,et al. Endogenous audits, uncertainty, and taxpayer assistance services: Theory and experiments , 2018, Journal of Public Economics.
[33] R. A. Muller,et al. The Good, the Bad, and the Regulator: An Experimental Test of Two Conditional Audit Schemes , 2004 .
[34] Ernst Fehr,et al. Third Party Punishment and Social Norms , 2004 .
[35] R. Di Tella,et al. The Role of Wages and Auditing during a Crackdown on Corruption in the City of Buenos Aires* , 2003, The Journal of Law and Economics.
[36] Gary H. McClelland,et al. Why do people pay taxes , 1992 .
[37] Shlomo Maital,et al. A simulation study of income tax evasion , 1978 .
[38] R. Di Tella,et al. The Role of Wages and Auditing During a Crackdown on Corruption in the City of Buenos Aires , 2001 .
[39] Klaus M. Schmidt,et al. A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation , 1999 .
[40] Navin Kartik,et al. Strategic Communication with Lying Costs , 2009 .
[41] U. Fischbacher,et al. Lies in Disguise. An experimental study on cheating , 2013 .
[42] Gary H. McClelland,et al. Changing the Social Norm of Tax Compliance by Voting , 1999 .
[43] U. Fischbacher. z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments , 1999 .
[44] Dan Ariely,et al. Self-Serving Altruism? The Lure of Unethical Actions that Benefit Others. , 2013, Journal of economic behavior & organization.