Promotion prospects and career paths of local party-government leaders in China

Abstract Drawing on biographical data of 202 county and municipal party-government leaders from Zhejiang as well as in-depth interviews, this article finds a bifurcation of career paths among local party-government leaders. It shows that a significant proportion of local leaders has little prospect of promotion. Age restrictions alone make over half of incumbents ineligible for advancement, thus practically placing them in the category of ‘ceilinged cadres’. In addition, more than three quarters of local party-government leaders can be considered ‘native cadres’, i.e. local officials who serving in the same municipality in which they were born or developed their career. Put together, nearly half (43%) of local leaders are both ceilinged and native, who might have to overcome double barriers in order to climb up to a higher rank. Further analysis shows that ‘native-ceilinged cadres’ may not single-mindedly strive for promotion and may instead pursue a local-oriented career path. The article concludes that, instead of implicitly assuming that all local leaders are motivated by promotion, more attention should be paid to specific career incentives among local leaders, which shape their behavior patterns and thus affect the political interactions between the central leadership and local authorities.

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