Regulating Big Tech: the role of enhanced disclosures

Attempts by governments to curb the market power of ‘Big Tech’ (Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, Meta Platforms, and Microsoft) are impeded by limited public information on their diversified digital platform ecosystems. Big Tech’s annual 10-K financial reports disclose little about their globally dominant ‘free’ services, platform user numbers, and monetization practices, and suites of products. To support antitrust and regulatory oversight, we propose mandatory 10-K type disclosures covering Big Tech’s: (i) internally used operating metrics (e.g. monthly active users), which underpin platform market share and monetization; (ii) ubiquitous ‘free’ products which escape traditional ‘profit and loss’ reporting; (iii) ‘monetization’ processes detailing how platforms make money from user data and attention; and (iv) product-by-product reporting through updating segment reporting rules. Disclosures should be mandatory for digital ‘gatekeepers’ and eventually integrated into reporting standards for all digital platforms.

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