Core-selecting auctions with incomplete information

Core-selecting auctions were proposed as alternatives to the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanism for environments with complementarities. In this paper, we consider a simple incomplete-information model that allows correlations among bidders’ values. We perform a full equilibrium analysis of three core-selecting auction formats as applied to the “local-local-global” model. We show that seller revenues and efficiency from core-selecting auctions can improve as correlations among bidders’ values increase, producing outcomes that are closer to the true core than are the VCG outcomes. Thus, there may be a theoretical justification for policymakers to utilize core-selecting auctions rather than the VCG mechanism in certain environments.

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