Safety assurance: fact or fiction?

Many safety-related systems are also socio-technical systems and providing safety assurance for these systems is extremely challenging. Providing comprehensive safety assurance evidence for the technical elements of anything but the simplest of systems is impossible due to the complexity involved and these difficulties increase dramatically when the human and organizational factors have to be considered. Apart from the inherent complexity associated with the development of safe socio-technical systems, there are other reasons to believe that safety assurance claims can be overly optimistic and based more upon fiction than fact. This paper will examine where improvements could be made to the safety assurance process. The paper will first consider some of the reasons why safety assurance claims may be based too much upon 'self-fulfilling prophesies' appealing only to confirmatory and highly subjective evidence because of inherent methodological limitations with the safety assurance process and an overreliance on professional judgement. The paper will then examine a significant but common area of neglect for safety assurance claims; specifically, the widespread fixation on technology despite the prevalence of socio-technical issues for many safety-related systems. Finally, suggestions will be made regarding how to improve the validity of safety assurance claims through the use of metaevidence.

[1]  Steven G. Vick Degrees of Belief: Subjective Probability and Engineering Judgment , 2002 .

[2]  M. Kendall,et al.  The Logic of Scientific Discovery. , 1959 .

[3]  John A. McDermid,et al.  Software Safety: Where's the Evidence? , 2001, SCS.

[4]  Stephen Turner Kuhn, T. S. , 2006 .

[5]  P. Nidditch,et al.  Enquiries: Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals , 1966 .

[6]  Bev Littlewood,et al.  Validation of ultrahigh dependability for software-based systems , 1993, CACM.

[7]  Carl Sandom,et al.  Human Factors Considerations for System Safety , 2002, SSS.

[8]  S. McKenna Professional judgment in vocational education and training: a set of resources , 2006 .

[9]  S. Okasha What did Hume Really Show about Induction , 2001 .

[10]  Frederick Winslow Taylor,et al.  科学管理原理=The principles of scientific management , 2014 .

[11]  Carl Sandom,et al.  Success and failure: human as hero -- human as hazard , 2007 .

[12]  Benoît Pelopidas,et al.  The Next Catastrophe Reducing Our Vulnerabilities to Natural, Industrial and Terrorist Disasters , 2012 .

[13]  Alexander M. Millkey The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable , 2009 .

[14]  Carl Sandom,et al.  Human factors for engineers , 2004 .

[15]  Steve Kinnersly,et al.  Safety Cases - what can we learn from Science? , 2011, SSS.

[16]  T. Kuhn,et al.  The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. , 1964 .

[17]  E. Trist The Evolution of Socio-Technical Systems: A Conceptual Framework and an Action Research Program , 1981 .

[18]  D. C. Dashfield HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE , 1954 .

[19]  Martyn Thomas,et al.  Engineering judgement , 2004, Architectural Research Quarterly.

[20]  Karl R. Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery. , 1977 .

[21]  R. Bell,et al.  IEC 61508: functional safety of electrical/electronic/ programme electronic safety-related systems: overview , 1999 .