Coalition strategy-proof mechanisms for provision of excludable public goods

Abstract I study coalition strategy-proof implementation in public goods environments where agents may be excluded from enjoying the public good. I characterize individually rational, coalition strategy-proof mechanisms with the Equal Treatment of Equals property and prove that Moulin's serial mechanism Pareto-dominates every continuous mechanism in this class.

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