论文信息 - Caps in asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information

Caps in asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information

We study asymmetric all-pay auctions where two privately informed agents bid for a prize. We show that capping the bids is profitable for a designer who wants to maximize the sum of bids (revenue). This finding confims the results of Che and Gale (1998) in the context of incomplete information and completes the analysis of Gavious, Moldovanu and Sela (2002) by analyzing the case of ex-ante asymmetric players.

Nicolas Sahuguet

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