Consensus with Oneself: Within-Person Choice Aggregation in the Laboratory

Unfortunately, the decision sciences are segregated into nearly distinct academic societies and distinct research paradigms. This intellectual isolationism has allowed different approaches to the decision sciences to suffer from different, but important, conceptual gaps. Following earlier efforts to cross-fertilize individual and social choice research, this paper applies behavioral social choice concepts to individual decision making.

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