Cooperation Spillovers in Coordination Games

Motivated by problems of coordination failure observed in weak-link games, we experimentally investigate behavioral spillovers for order-statistic coordination games. Subjects play the minimum- and median-effort coordination games simultaneously and sequentially. The results show the precedent for cooperative behavior spills over from the median game to the minimum game when the games are played sequentially. Moreover, spillover occurs even when group composition changes, although the effect is not as strong. We also find that the precedent for uncooperative behavior does not spill over from the minimum game to the median game. These findings suggest guidelines for increasing cooperative behavior within organizations.

[1]  S. Williams,et al.  Evaluating Outdoor Experiential Training for Leadership and Team Building. , 2003 .

[2]  Daniel Houser,et al.  High Stakes Behavior with Low Payoffs: Inducing Preferences with Holt-Laury Gambles , 2009 .

[3]  Robin Hanson,et al.  Can Manipulators Mislead Prediction Market Observers , 2008 .

[4]  Jakub Steiner,et al.  Contagion through learning , 2008 .

[5]  David Porter,et al.  Group Prediction in Information Markets With and Without Trading Information and Price Manipulation Incentives , 2008 .

[6]  C. Shapiro,et al.  Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility , 1985 .

[7]  Nobuhiro Kiyotaki,et al.  Multiple Expectational Equilibria Under Monopolistic Competition , 1988 .

[8]  Charles A. Holt,et al.  Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects , 2002 .

[9]  E. Ostrom,et al.  Cooperation in PD Games: Fear, Greed, and History of Play , 2001 .

[10]  William F. Wright COGNITIVE INFORMATION PROCESSING BIASES: IMPLICATIONS FOR PRODUCERS AND USERS OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION* , 1980 .

[11]  Ken Binmore,et al.  The evolution of focal points , 2006, Games Econ. Behav..

[12]  G Gigerenzer,et al.  Reasoning the fast and frugal way: models of bounded rationality. , 1996, Psychological review.

[13]  Steven Gjerstad,et al.  Housing Market Price Tier Movements in an Expansion and Collapse , 2009 .

[14]  Roberto A. Weber,et al.  Timing and Virtual Observability in Ultimatum Bargaining and “Weak Link” Coordination Games , 2004 .

[15]  Giovanna Devetag,et al.  Precedent transfer in coordination games: An experiment , 2005 .

[16]  John Duffy,et al.  Cooperative behavior and the frequency of social interaction , 2009, Games Econ. Behav..

[17]  U. Fischbacher z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments , 1999 .

[18]  Todd L. Cherry,et al.  Rationality Crossovers * , 2002 .

[19]  Glenn M. McEvoy,et al.  Organizational change and outdoor management education , 1997 .

[20]  Charles E. Osgood,et al.  A Cross-Cultural Study of the Affective Meanings of Color , 1973 .

[21]  Scott E. Page,et al.  Can Game(s) Theory Explain Culture? , 2007 .

[22]  Larry Samuelson,et al.  Analogies, Adaptation, and Anomalies , 2001, J. Econ. Theory.

[23]  Roberto A. Weber,et al.  The Illusion of Leadership , 1996 .

[24]  John Dickhaut,et al.  Decision making and trade without probabilities , 2006 .

[25]  Robert J. Oxoby,et al.  Cognitive Dissonance, Pessimism, and Behavioral Spillover Effects , 2007 .

[26]  Andreas Blume,et al.  The effects of costless pre-play communication: Experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria , 2007, J. Econ. Theory.

[27]  Andrew Schotter,et al.  Worker Trust, System Vulnerability, and the Performance of Work Groups , 1996 .

[28]  P. Valdez,et al.  Effects of color on emotions. , 1994, Journal of experimental psychology. General.

[29]  W. Güth,et al.  Are we nice(r) to nice(r) people?—An experimental analysis , 2007 .

[30]  F. Paas,et al.  Instructional control of cognitive load in the training of complex cognitive tasks , 1994 .

[31]  T. W. Ross,et al.  Communication in Coordination Games , 1992 .

[32]  Karl-Martin Ehrhart,et al.  Coordination and information: recent experimental evidence , 2001 .

[33]  Roman M. Sheremeta Experimental Comparison of Multi-Stage and One-Stage Contests , 2009, Games Econ. Behav..

[34]  J. Brandts,et al.  IT'S WHAT YOU SAY, NOT WHAT YOU PAY: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF MANAGER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIPS IN OVERCOMING COORDINATION FAILURE , 2005 .

[35]  Siegfried K. Berninghaus,et al.  Time horizon and equilibrium selection in tacit coordination games: Experimental results , 1998 .

[36]  M. D. Dunnette Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology , 2005 .

[37]  Behavioral Spillovers in Multiple Games : An Experimental Study ∗ , 2009 .

[38]  Colin F. Camerer,et al.  Creating Expectational Assets in the Laboratory: Coordination in 'Weakest- Link' Games , 1994 .

[39]  Steven Postrel,et al.  Multitasking Teams With Variable Complementarity: Challenges for Capability Management , 2009 .

[40]  Roman M. Sheremeta,et al.  Reducing Efficiency through Communication in Competitive Coordination Games , 2009 .

[41]  Philippe Jehiel,et al.  Article in Press Games and Economic Behavior Feedback Spillover and Analogy-based Expectations: a Multi-game Experiment , 2022 .

[42]  S. Kozlowski,et al.  Work Groups and Teams in Organizations , 2003 .

[43]  Rationality Spillovers , 2000 .

[44]  Martin Sefton,et al.  Repetition and signalling: Experimental evidence from games with efficient equilibria , 2001 .

[45]  J. Brandts,et al.  A Change Would Do You Good... An Experimental Study on How to Overcome Coordination Failure in Organizations , 2006 .

[46]  F. Paas,et al.  Cognitive Load Measurement as a Means to Advance Cognitive Load Theory , 2003 .

[47]  Gunduz Caginalp,et al.  Asset Market Reactions to News: An Experimental Study , 2010 .

[48]  F. Mengel,et al.  Extrapolation in Games of Coordination and Dominance Solvable Games , 2011 .

[49]  Roman M. Sheremeta Perfect-Substitutes, Best-Shot, and Weakest-Link Contests between Groups , 2009 .

[50]  Rosemarie Nagel,et al.  The Effect of Intergroup Competition on Group Coordination: An Experimental Study , 1999, Games Econ. Behav..

[51]  John Dickhaut,et al.  Does information transparency decrease coordination failure? , 2010, Games Econ. Behav..

[52]  H. Simon,et al.  Models of Bounded Rationality: Empirically Grounded Economic Reason , 1997 .

[53]  Leonard Karakowsky,et al.  The role of trainee and environmental factors in transfer of training: an exploratory framework , 1999 .

[54]  John H. Kagel,et al.  Learning and transfer in signaling games , 2008 .

[55]  John Dickhaut,et al.  Generating Ambiguity in the Laboratory , 2007, Manag. Sci..

[56]  Roberto A. Weber Managing Growth to Achieve Efficient Coordination in Large Groups , 2002 .

[57]  Colin Camerer,et al.  Increasing Cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemmas by Establishing a Precedent of Efficiency in Coordination Games. , 2000, Organizational behavior and human decision processes.

[58]  John B. Bryant,et al.  A Simple Rational Expectations Keynes-type Model , 1983 .

[59]  J. Huyck,et al.  Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure , 1990 .

[60]  Roberto A. Weber,et al.  The Illusion of Leadership: Misattribution of Cause in Coordination Games , 2001 .

[61]  J. Reveley Path Dependence , 2008, Prisoners of the Past.

[62]  Peter A. Diamond,et al.  Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium , 1982, Journal of Political Economy.

[63]  Thomas W. Ross,et al.  Product Warranties and Double Moral Hazard , 1985 .

[64]  Roman M. Sheremeta,et al.  Contest Design: An Experimental Investigation , 2009 .

[65]  Noah Myung,et al.  Improving Coordination and Cooperation Through Competition , 2009 .

[66]  U. Fischbacher,et al.  Living in Two Neighborhoods - Social Interaction Effects in the Laboratory , 2013 .

[67]  Walter P. Heller,et al.  Equilibrium analysis: Coordination failure under complete markets with applications to effective demand , 1986 .

[68]  J. Huyck,et al.  Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games , 1991 .

[69]  C. Gersick Time and Transition in Work Teams: Toward a New Model of Group Development , 1988 .

[70]  John Dickhaut,et al.  A Neuronal Mechanism of Choice , 2008 .